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Abstract— Machine ethics is a key challenge in times when digital systems play an increasing role in 
people’s life. At the core of machine ethics is the handling of personal data and the security of machine 
operations. Yet, privacy and security engineering are a challenge in today’s business world where personal 
data markets, corporate deadlines and a lag of perfectionism frame the context in which engineers need to 
work. Besides these organizational and market challenges, each engineer has his or her specific view on the 
importance of these values that can foster or inhibit taking them into consideration. We present the results 
of an empirical study of 124 engineers based on the Theory of Planned Behavior and Jonas’ Principle of 
Responsibility to understand the drivers and impediments of ethical system development as far as privacy 
and security engineering are concerned. We find that many engineers find the two values important, but do 
not enjoy working on them. We also find that many struggle with the organizational environment. They face a 
lack of time and autonomy that is necessary for building ethical systems, even at this basic level. 
Organizations’ privacy and security norms are often too weak or even oppose value-based design, putting 
engineers in conflict with their organizations. Our data indicate that it is largely engineers’ individually 
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HE rapid diffusion of machines into all spheres of human life is increasing the call for more ethical reflections in their 
development. When autonomous cars carry passengers, robots serve the elderly, and personal agents speak with 
people about their most intimate life details, questions of ethical baselines for such technologies become inevitable. 
In his 2006 essay on “The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics” James Moor outlines how machines 
should be designed to avoid unethical outcomes (implicit ethical agents) and even encode and learn ethics where 
this is feasible (explicit ethical agents) [1]. 
With his 2006 call for implicit ethical agents, Moor was early to tap into a strand of research that aims to respect 
human values in the design of systems [2-4]. He talked about “machine virtues” at the time, naming issues like safety 
and reliability. Since then, many values have been recognized as vital for machines; in fact, phenomenologically 
each machine can bear unique values depending on its use context [5]. But there are some values that seem to be 
particularly relevant in system design because they relate to the very way in which data is handled across 
technologies and contexts. These include privacy and security, which have consequently been subject to long-term 
academic efforts [see for e.g. 6, 7-9] and have been recognized in technology regulation all over the world [10-12]. In 
fact, scholars have made a tremendous effort to develop privacy-enhancing solutions at least since the 1990s [9, 13-
15] and the security engineering field has proposed major design standards [16, 17].  
Yet, apart from some success stories such as SSL/HTTPS, the widespread use of proposed solutions and 
standards is still lacking behind (the exception being security-related application areas such as wireless payment 
systems). Even the NSA ignored baseline security measures that would have protected them against Edward 
Snowden’s revelations [18]. Not surprisingly, data breaches abound all over the world: in 2017, in the US alone, over 
178 million records of personal data were exposed in over 1500 data breaches and 42000 security attacks, a 45 
percent increase over the already record high figures reported for 2016 [19, 20]. Such breaches and attacks are said 
to lead to billions in losses for corporations [21]. Consumer studies reveal that unease is spreading among citizens, 
as people fear losing control over their personal data and see their privacy being compromised [22]. This situation is 
troubling. What will happen if soon robots serving people are hacked and turned into competitive and aggressive 
robots as Vanderelst and Winfield outline in their article on “The Dark Side of Ethical Robots” [23]?  Who is 
responsible when personal agents like Alexa or Siri betray the trust of their owners, because privacy awareness has 
not been properly designed into them? 
If ordinary people were asked as to who is responsible for this situation, they would probably point at the 
engineering world. Historically, engineers have always been held responsible for their products. The Babylonian 
Code of Hammurabi (1750 BC), one of the oldest deciphered writings of significant length in the world, says: “If a 
builder has built a house for a man and has not made his work strong enough and the house he has made has 
collapsed and caused the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be killed. If it destroyed possessions, he 
shall make recompense for whatever he destroyed. Moreover, since the house he had built collapsed because he 
had not made it strong enough, he shall rebuild the house which collapsed from his own resources.” [24, p. 109] 
Yet, today we know that engineers are not independent craftsmen, but often work in teams where they face an 
organizational environment that is not always easy. Pressed for time, many have difficulties to even live up to their 
associations’ code of ethics (i.e. ACM, IEEE), which only ask for minimum value standards, such as the quality and 
reliability of products [25]. It has been reported that organizations see value conflicts arise within development teams, 
which need to be actively managed [26]. Is the current situation of privacy and security “nightmares” a testament to 
such organizational challenges, which can be fixed given better incentive structures? Or are we witnessing a deeper 
personality and socio-cultural issue that hinders privacy and security engineering at a deeper level? 
Unfortunately, we know very little about privacy and security behavior of engineers in their development work [26-
30]. Only four studies have looked at this issue [27-30]. Particularly noteworthy is the study by Lahlou, Langheinrich, 
& Röcker who found in 2003 that engineers were very reluctant to embrace privacy: Privacy “was either an abstract 
problem [to them], not a problem yet (they are ‘only prototypes’), not a problem at all (firewalls and cryptography 
would take care of it), not their problem (but one for politicians, lawmakers, or, more vaguely, society), or simply not 
part of the project deliverables“ [28, p. 60]. The only quantitative study that exists on privacy and security behavior 
focuses on smartphone app developers [30] and largely confirms these insights. It shows that many app developers 
lack awareness of privacy and security measures and make engineering decisions in an ad hoc manner, especially 
when working in smaller organizations. They are also conflicted on privacy due to current economic trends that 
support personal data markets [31]. None of these existing studies have developed a systematic model that would 
identify drivers and impediments of privacy and security engineering behavior across technologies. We therefore lack 
an important piece of research in our efforts to build ethical machines: We know hardly anything about the people 
who build them. 
T
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To address this gap in research we studied 124 software and system engineers working for a wide spectrum of 
companies and research institutions around the world and at various hierarchical levels. The study is based on the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and Jonas’ Principle of Responsibility as baseline behavioral models [32-34]. In 
addition, we report on six interviews with senior engineers at globally leading IT companies and research centers. 
We believe that our findings strongly contribute to our understanding of privacy and security engineering, because it 
looks into the practical realities, conflicts and challenges we need to confront in organizations to build more secure 
and private systems. If we succeed in doing this, then we will have taken a major step towards more ethical systems 
in general. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Privacy and Security Behavior and the Theory of Planned Behavior 
We define security engineering behavior as any activity undertaken by an engineer that fosters the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation of the data collected or services created. We define privacy 
engineering behavior as any activity undertaken by an engineer that (1) reduces the collection and storage of 
personal data (i.e. through data minimization or anonymization), (2) limits the sharing of personal data with third 
parties not explicitly authorized by the data subject, (3) gives users full information about what happens to their 
personal data (transparency) and (4) gives users real choice whether to consent to the processing of their personal 
data. With these definitions, we consider privacy and security as relevant dimensions for implicit ethical agents [1]. 
When we use the term “engineer” hereafter, we refer to both software engineers and systems engineers. While 
there is no clear-cut definition of the two roles, they are usually differentiated by the scope of system issues on which 
they focus [35]. In this classification, a software engineer would mostly design and write code, while a systems 
engineer looks more holistically across multiple aspects and technologies (software, hardware, human factors, and 
processes). We refer to both forms of engineering because ethical issues such as the privacy and security design of 
an information technology are typically addressed at various technical levels, including the architecture of a system, 
its hardware and software design, and the way these are embedded in organizational processes. 
According to the issue-contingent model of ethical decision-making behavior in organizations [36], any moral issue 
first needs to be recognized and judged upon by a person. Only following this moral awareness phase, moral intent is 
formed and people behave (hopefully) in line with their intent. For the present context of privacy and security 
engineering, recognizing the moral issue is not a given. When privacy or security are not recognized in IT product 
design, there are normally no immediate sanctions from users, sometimes not even in the long-term. In the absence 
of effective legal sanctions (and hence any reasonable applicability of expected-utility theory [37, 38]) the question 
arises as to whether engineers will be aware of privacy and security issues at all. Some research doubts this [28, 30]. 
So what could drive engineers’ motivation to consider privacy and security in their systems?  
We chose TPB as our primary behavioral model because it circumvents the limits of expected-utility theory for our 
context. It is also widely used in the ethical decision-making literature [39] and was successfully applied to 
understand unethical programming behavior [40]. TPB states that planned human behavior is generally caused by 
three core factors: (1) people’s (instrumental and experiential) attitudes towards a behavior, (2) people’s subjective 
norms for that behavior, and (3) their perceived behavioral control to perform the behavior [41]. In the following 
section, we take a close look into these main constructs of the TPB in relation to our context of privacy and security 
engineering behavior and derive our hypotheses. 
 
1) Engineers’ Privacy and Security Attitudes and Beliefs  
 
Ajzen’s TPB, as well as other psychological theories [42, 43], emphasize peoples’ attitudes as key to 
understanding why and how they act. Attitudes towards behaviors can be instrumental (how a person rationally 
values a behavior), or they can be experimental (how a person values the experience of the behavior) [41]. For 
example, instrumental attitudes determine if we find a behavior useful, valuable, important or sensible. Experiential 
attitudes, on the other hand, determine if we find a behavior enjoyable, pleasant or frustrating. Both these attitudes 
are typically driven by beliefs held by an individual. For instance, if an engineer believes that “privacy is dead” or that 
“any system can be hacked”, these beliefs can negatively influence their attitude towards investing time in privacy-
preserving and secure systems. So what are common beliefs related to privacy and security?  
It is well known that the values of privacy and security are ambivalent. Many voice the belief that privacy is 
outdated at a time of ubiquitous computing, when people share so much of their data on social network platforms [44] 
and when more data seems to promise more knowledge [45, 46]. Developer platforms see both discussions on 
“human privacy whiners”, as well as mutual touting of privacy-enhancing mechanisms [47, p. 9].  Some authors 
regard privacy as a value that needs to be traded off for more transparency [48, 49] or knowledge creation [46], 
presuming that these cannot co-exist with privacy. Moreover, embracing privacy engineering costs time and money, 
while at the same time undermining business models that rely on personal data as a property on sale [29, 47]. Such 
negative beliefs have been countered by privacy advocates, who argue that the respect for privacy in system design 
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creates business advantages [50], reduces corporate liability [51] and risks [52], and does not need to undermine 
security [53, 54]. Advocates argue that privacy is a fundamental right [55, 56], which is essential to balancing power 
in functioning democracies [55], especially vis-à-vis corporates [47].  
Security beliefs and attitudes see similar contradictory dynamics. Some feel that the importance of (national) 
security is overstated [57], while others use it extensively to justify investments in a security infrastructure [58]. The 
business impact of security is highly related to the risk inherent in systems’ infrastructures, which are easily 
underestimated by those who have to pay for the technical investments [59] and potentially overstated by those who 
earn money from these [60]. The practicability of security is doubted by those who believe that any system can be 
hacked anyways, while others feel confident that cryptography can sufficiently protect security [61] and that, in 
principle, we can build error-free and hence fully secure systems.  
If we take all of these contradictory beliefs together, it is reasonable to expect that engineers have equally mixed 
attitudes towards privacy and security. In our interviews with senior engineers, we found that experiential attitudes 
towards privacy were often negative. They argued that it is difficult to implement effective privacy mechanisms and 
that users could still be tricked into disclosure. That said, the instrumental attitudes were more positive. Almost all 
interviewees agreed to the necessity of protecting users’ privacy somehow (undisclosed reference).  
Based on these insights, as well as the direction of influence postulated by TPB, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Experiential attitudes towards privacy and security are positively related to privacy and 
security engineering behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Instrumental attitudes towards privacy and security are positively related to privacy and 
security engineering behavior. 
 
According to the TPB, the beliefs that are the base for the attitudes towards certain behaviors are always context 
and behavior specific, so we are dissuaded from hypothesizing a relationship between every privacy and security 
belief and the engineers’ attitudes towards building privacy and secure systems. However, we did explore which 
beliefs relate to these attitudes (see below). 
 
2) The Role of the Professional Environment for Privacy and Security Engineering 
 
Recent studies provide support for the claim that IT professionals comply with organizational expectations when it 
comes to privacy engineering or ethical system design at large. Shaw [62, p. 314] has shown that webmasters seek 
“organizational consensus” when deciding if an action related to privacy is ethical or unethical: “Webmasters do not 
make ethical decisions in a vacuum, but instead look to their co-workers for guidance”. In a large-scale study in 
Hungary and the Netherlands, Szekely [63] has shown that the majority of IT professionals usually agree with the 
organizational decisions made about the handling of personal data throughout a project. If they happened to disagree 
with a decision, they would definitely let it be known, but the great majority would still go along with the organizational 
decision. Only 12 percent of the respondents in Szekely’s study stated that they would refuse to implement the 
decision in such a situation. Considering the generally positive relationship between organizational norm and 
engineering behavior, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Engineers’ subjective norm for privacy and security engineering is positively related to privacy 
and security engineering behavior  
 
3) Perceived Behavioral Control over Privacy and Security Engineering.  
 
In the TPB, next to attitudes and social norm, the final determinant of behavior is the perceived behavioral control 
[64]. It determines how easy or difficult it is for individuals to perform a behavior, based both on their abilities and on 
the context in which they operate. Organizational teams operate in a highly competitive, cost-minimizing, and hype-
driven rush towards technical upgrades [3]. As a result, software engineering teams often work in a climate that can 
be hostile to non-functional system requirements such as privacy and security. A good description of such an 
environment can be found in Berenbach and Broy’s account of professional and ethical dilemmas in software 
engineering [25]. The authors describe how the rush towards system delivery can lead to organizationally induced 
problematic ethical behavior, the difficulty to honor agreements, the lack of comprehensive and thorough evaluation 
of computer systems, a promotion of “fictionware”, and the tendency to sweep lack of quality under the rug.  
Against this background, software engineers might simply not have enough time or autonomy, and consequently 
control, to engage in privacy and security engineering behavior. On the other hand, Schaefer [65, p. 3] observes that 
engineers are the ones “closest to the work” and therefore often get from their managers the freedoms to pursue 
what is necessary. That said, plans and processes are still a non-negligible part of the professional engineers’ 
surrounding. The organizational set-up, staffing, sales deals, delivery dates or external funding set limits to the length 
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of development efforts and, by extension, engineers’ ability to engage in privacy and security engineering. Our 
interviews revealed that even senior engineers do not hold positive control perceptions (undisclosed reference). They 
state that privacy issues are technically difficult to solve and that the concept of privacy is unclear. These issues, 
found in other studies as well [27, 30], point to an issue of knowledge and education that could lead engineers to not 
perceive sufficient control over privacy and security engineering. The corresponding hypothesis to these practical 
challenges is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The perceived behavioral control over privacy and security engineering is positively related to 
privacy and security engineering behavior  
 
B. The Role of Perceived Responsibility for Privacy and Security Engineering 
In addition to using the TPB for our research, we also explored the relevance of perceived personal responsibility 
of engineers in our work. Virtue ethics sees people acting ethically just for the sake of doing the right thing [66]. 
Some scholars trace virtuous awareness or consciousness of values and ethics back to a cognitive moral 
development that some people have more than others [67] and that is one of the core individual characteristics 
prohibiting unethical intentions and choices in organizations [68]. In his famous 1976 book on “Principles of 
Responsibility”, Hans Jonas called for more engineering responsibility, as otherwise the future would have no seat at 
technology design tables [69].  
In contrast to this, Schaefer asked “Should the programmer be the one solely held accountable for the software 
faults?” [65]. Lahlou and colleagues [28] found that engineers felt that privacy was not their problem, but one for 
politicians, lawmakers, or, more vaguely, society at large. Greene and Shilton report that developers believe users  
are responsible for their privacy by simply not accepting usage terms or using privacy-enhancing tools [47], but they 
also see developers touting good privacy-enhancing solutions [27]. In our own interview study with senior engineers 
in corporate and university research, we found support for the perception that someone else is responsible for 
privacy, especially corporate lawyers, but not so much the engineers themselves (undisclosed reference). This 
finding is also present in a larger quantitative study of IT professionals [63, p. 209], which found that “the majority of 
the respondents think that they bear no responsibility in ensuring the legality of the system they help to develop or 
run: the responsibility lies with either the management or the clients, but in any case outside their competency“. 
Along these lines, it might be that it is low perceived responsibility for privacy and security that has led to limited 
engagement in respective design efforts, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The perceived responsibility for privacy and security engineering is positively related to privacy and 
security engineering behave 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships and gives an overview of the model we explored empirically.  
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 around here 
----------------------------- 
Besides establishing and testing this hypothesized model, we controlled for the potential belief structures 
described above and potentially explaining the instrumental and experiential attitudes. On theoretical grounds and in 
accordance with Ajzen, we did not include these beliefs in our model, since they are not expected to be internally 
consistent [41]. We also included concrete organizational context variables in our investigations, which might 
influence the subjective norm. Furthermore, we controlled for individual characteristics, which were shown relevant in 
earlier studies of unethical managerial choices. These studies suggest that individual’s perceived locus of control 
[68], their motivation [70-72], and their personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability and openness to experience) [73] might influence engineers’ behavior. Finally, we included religiousness, 
because an extensive literature study on the frequent failure of software projects identified religious views as a 
moderating factor [74] and many ethical decision-making studies in organizations have revealed religiousness to be a 
significant predictor of good behavior [39]. 
III. METHOD 
A. Sampling 
We used an online questionnaire to investigate the drivers and impediments of privacy and security engineering. 
Participants were recruited through a mailing list from the “UbiComp” Conference (containing 252 e-mail addresses), 
which is a conference on new and avant-garde technologies. We used this mailing list to ensure that we reached 
engineers in the highly dynamic field of software and system design, that is, engineers who develop new prototypes 
and architectures and not legacy systems or corporate infrastructures for which privacy and security designs may 
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have been decided long ago. In addition, we advertised our survey in relevant social network groups and with a few 
innovative software companies in our surrounding (including a start-up and a major retailer’s IT department).  
B. Measures 
When starting the survey, participants received a briefing of our privacy and security engineering definitions (see 
above) to ensure a common understanding of the behavior under study. The battery of questions that followed was 
structured in line with the TPB. We took Ajzen’s conceptual and methodological considerations for the design of a 
TPB questionnaire [41]. We adapted his scales for the privacy and security engineering context, measuring behavior, 
attitudes, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control as described in the following. Relevant Behavioral 
Predictors of Privacy and Security Engineering  
To measure reported behavior, we asked participants whether they had incorporated privacy and/or security 
mechanisms into the systems that they had built in the past 4 to 5 years. Answers ranged between never and always 
on a 5 point Likert scale. To measure engineers’ attitudes towards privacy and security engineering, we used a 5-
point semantic differential scale with twelve bipolar adjective pairs that describe the instrumental component (e.g. 
privacy engineering is worthless - valuable) as well as the experiential qualities (e.g. security engineering is annoying 
- pleasing) of incorporating privacy and security mechanisms. For the subjective norm we used 5-Point Likert scale 
items ranging from 1 — “I should not” to 5 — “I should”. The items have  “injunctive quality, consistent with the 
concept of social norm” [41, p.6]. Example item is “Regardless of my organization, people who I have a lot of respect 
for probably think that I should/should not incorporate privacy mechanisms into the systems I build”. For perceived 
behavioral control we used questions that measure the perceived capability of performing the behavior (whether 
engineers could incorporate privacy/security mechanisms if they wanted to), as well as controllability of the behavior 
(whether it is up to them to incorporate the mechanisms). Both sets of items were measured on 5-Point Likert scales 
ranging from definitely false to definitely true, and strongly disagree to strongly disagree, respectively. In addition to 
the constructs derived from the TPB, we asked participants an additional self-developed question about their 
perceived responsibility: “To what extent do you feel you have responsibility for the privacy/security characteristics of 
the systems you build?”. The item was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from no responsibility to full 
responsibility.  
In addition to the direct predictors of engineering behavior we hypothesized, and in accordance with Ajzen, we 
included additional items that measured a number of beliefs related to privacy and security engineering [41]. 
Specifically, we included six political beliefs and six technical beliefs held by engineers about privacy and security. 
These were revealed as important in the qualitative expert interviews as well as in the literature review. Examples are 
“more data is more knowledge” or value tradeoffs such as “transparency is more important than privacy”. 
Additionally, we included questions about normative beliefs (i.e. what engineers believe is expected of them from 
their organizations) and their motivation to comply with those expectations. The interplay between normative beliefs 
(organizational norm) and  motivation to comply is assumed to influence the subjective norm of individuals [41]. 
Finally, we included measures of engineers’ control beliefs, specifically related to the knowledge they have and the 
autonomy and time given to them by their organizations to incorporate privacy and security mechanisms.  
Finally, we controlled for demographic and personality variables, as well as engineers’ organizational context. 
Specifically, we collected information on an engineer’s hierarchical position in the organization and employment 
status (hierarchical rank, self-employed, employed), the type of organization (industry, academia, government, etc.), 
as well as age, sex and country of residence. We measured locus of control with scales by Levenson [75], motivation 
with scales from Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, and Puca [76], and the Big-5 personality traits with Gosling, 
Rentfrow, and Swann’s instrument [77].  We controlled for religiousness with a scale developed by Wilkes, Burnett, 
and Howell [78]. 
C. Procedure 
In order to test our hypotheses, that is, to understand why engineers did or did not incorporate privacy and security 
designs into their systems in the past 4 to 5 years, we calculated separate models for privacy and for security in line 
with Figure 1 and our hypotheses. For each value we conducted a step-wise regression analysis with all TPB 
predictors entered in the first step, and responsibility added to the model in the second step. We chose this method 
in order to highlight the potential incremental validity of perceived responsibility over and above the predictors 
postulated by the TPB. In addition, we calculated the overall structural fit of the models in AMOS [79].  
After the initial analysis we tried to modify the initial model in order to increase its predictive validity. We also 
looked into significant differences and relationships between the control variables and all relevant model variables 
(predictor and outcome variables) using t-tests, analysis of variance and simple correlations, depending on the type 
of control variable. In the results section we report only the significant differences and relationship between the 
control variables and the model variables. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. Sample and Descriptive Analysis 
In total, 292 engineers started to answer the survey and 43 percent completed it, resulting in a final sample of 124 
completed questionnaires. On average, it took participants 38 minutes to complete the questionnaire. As 
compensation for participants’ effort, we offered a lottery-participation for an iPhone, an iPod, as well as Amazon 
vouchers (1 x 100 EUR, 1x 50 EUR, and 5 x 20 EUR).  
The respondents in the sample were 81 percent male and on average 36 years old. Thirty-three percent (N = 39) 
of them were from German-speaking countries, 13 percent (N = 16) engineers were from the US, and 10 percent (N 
= 12) were from Italy. The rest had 29 different nationalities from across the world. In terms of work position and 
environment, 77 percent (N = 96) of the respondents were professional engineers and 23 percent (N = 28) were PhD 
students. Sixty-two percent (N = 73) work in a research-related environment (i.e. university, corporate R&D or 
research institutes), 48 percent (N = 46) in product development for an IT company, two for NGOs, and three for 
governments. Hierarchically, 25 percent (N = 29) engineers indicated that they were in leadership positions. 
Just under two-thirds of the engineers indicated that they incorporated privacy and security preserving features into 
the systems they built in the past 4 to 5 years. This means that in more than one third of the cases privacy and 
security-preserving features were not built into the systems. Specifically, 36 percent (N=44) of the engineers stated 
that they had rarely or never incorporated privacy mechanisms into the systems that they built, and 35 percent 
(N=43) said that they have rarely or never incorporated security mechanisms.  
The great majority of engineers, however (91 percent for both privacy and security), think that privacy and security 
engineering is useful, valuable and important. A lot less (60 percent for privacy and 63 percent for security) find 
incorporating these values pleasing, exciting, or interesting. On the 5-point scales, mean values for the instrumental 
evaluations were Mpr = 4.19 (SDpr = 0.76) for privacy and Msec = 4.24 (SDsec = 0.75) for security; for experiential 
evaluation, they were Mpr= 3.32 (SDpr = 0.82) for privacy and Msec = 3.31 (SDsec = 0.82) for security. 
The subjective norm for incorporating privacy mechanisms was also very high (Mpr = 4.13, SDpr = 1.10). Only 13 
engineers (11 percent) indicated that the people, for whom they have a lot of respect, expect them not to incorporate 
privacy mechanisms. The same goes for security: 99 engineers (80 percent) have a high subjective norm for security 
engineering (Msec = 4.21, SDsec = 1.02). Only 10 engineers (8 percent) do not subscribe to this positive norm.  
The behavioral control perceptions of privacy and security engineering were mixed. A substantial proportion of 
engineers (37 percent or N = 46 for privacy and 40 percent or N = 50 for security) do not feel that they have sufficient 
control over implementing privacy and security mechanisms (Mpr = 3.58, SDpr= 1.09; Msec = 3.61, SDsec= 1.00). This is 
not due to their capability (66 percent or N = 82 for privacy and 72 percent or N = 89 for security state that if they 
wanted to, they could design these values into systems), but due to controllability: 51 percent (N = 63) pointed out 
that (in their organization) it is not (solely) up to them whether they will pursue privacy and security engineering. The 
degree of perceived behavioral control over privacy and security engineering is positively correlated with the 
hierarchical position: managers have the highest perceived behavioral control, followed by independent (self-
employed) coders, followed by employees in the lower ranks (Fpr (2,114) = 12.27 p<.001; Fsec (2,114) = 12.63 p < 
.001). Finally, the majority of engineers (63 percent for privacy and 62 percent for security) also feel responsible for 
the two values (Mpr = 3.63 (SDpr = 1.04), Msec = 3.66 (SDsec= 1.07)). Here, too, engineers in management positions 
(including the self-managing independent coders) report more responsibility (Fpr (2,114) = 3.10, p<.05; Fsec (2,114) = 
2.74, p = 0.69). 
B. Predictors of Privacy and Security Engineering 
The hypothesized TPB models explained 36 percent of the variance in past privacy engineering and 37 percent of 
the variance in past security engineering (Table 1). Furthermore, they both had a good structural fit (χ2pr(93) = 
140.39, CFIpr = .947, RMSEApr = 064; χ2sec(93) = 166.12, CFIsec = .944, RMSEAsec = 064) [80]. However, few of the 
postulated predictors of the TPB seem to play a role in explaining privacy and security engineering behavior. For 
privacy, neither experiential attitude (ß = .11, p > .05), subjective norm (ß = .02, p > .05), nor perceived behavioral 
control (ß = .07, p > .05) could successfully predict the implementation of privacy mechanisms. The only successful 
predictors for privacy engineering were instrumental attitude (ß = .33, p < .001) and perceived responsibility (ß = .36, 
p < .001). Perceived responsibility alone explained 10 percent of the variance in past privacy engineering. Perceived 
responsibility is hence more important than any of the TPB predictors. Thus, for privacy engineering our results 
support only hypotheses H1b and H4 (but not H1a, H2 and H3). However, it should be noted that the distribution of 
subjective norm among the engineers was so skewed to the positive side and had so little variance (almost all 
engineers had high subjective norm for privacy and security engineering) that this could be a reason for its low 
predictive power.  
For security engineering we found that both instrumental (ß = .19, p < .01) and experiential attitudes (ß = .26, p < 
.01) play a role, lending support for hypothesis H1a, and H1b. However, both subjective norm (ß = -.03, p > .05) and 
perceived behavioral control (ß = .07, p > .05) were not significant predictors of security engineering. We therefore 
have to reject hypotheses H2 and H3 for security engineering. Here, too, the distribution of subjective norm was 
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skewed and lacked variance. Perceived responsibility was positively related to security engineering (ß = .46, p < 
.001) and by itself explains as much as 19 percent of the variance in security engineering. Thus, our results strongly 
support hypothesis H4. Table 1 summarizes the regression results for both privacy and security engineering.  
---------------------------- 
Table 1 around here 
----------------------------- 
1) The (Indirect) Influence of Beliefs on Privacy and Security Engineering 
In the next steps, we wanted to explore why some of the predictors established by the TPB are doing so poorly in 
explaining privacy and security engineering behavior. We started by looking into engineers’ political and technical 
beliefs. We studied all beliefs separately to uncover the relevant ones, because beliefs are not theorized to be 
internally consistent [41].  
As can be seen from the decreasing order of agreement with the beliefs in Table 2, engineers in our sample varied 
substantially in their beliefs about privacy and security. It is noteworthy that political beliefs see much more 
agreement than technical beliefs. 
---------------------------- 
Table 2 around here 
-----------------------------    
Three of these beliefs stick out as significant attitude predictors, most prominently the belief in a necessary power-
balance between corporations and citizens. Engineers who believe in the importance of this power-balance find both 
privacy and security engineering more useful and valuable than engineers who do not find the power balance 
important (rpr = .28, p < .01; rsec = .24, p < .05). Moreover, engineers who call for this balance also find privacy 
engineering to be more enjoyable (rpr = .22, p < .01; rsec = .14, p > .05) and they were more likely to engage in privacy 
and security engineering in the past (rpr = .31, p < .001; rsec = .21, p < .05). Surprisingly, a power balance between 
governments and citizens is not significantly correlated with for engineers’ attitudes even though it rates high in 
importance.  
The second relevant belief (on which engineers’ opinions are divided) is that there is a trade-off between 
transparency and privacy. Engineers who prefer transparent systems over private ones hold less favorable attitudes 
towards privacy and security engineering than engineers who do not. The experiential attitude towards privacy and 
security engineering suffers especially for those engineers who value transparency more than they value privacy (rpr 
= -.41, p < .001; rsec = -.29, p < .05), as does the instrumental attitude towards privacy (rpr = -.36, p < .05). Finally, we 
find that engineers who believe that they can build zero-fault systems have a higher probability to enjoy security 
engineering (rsec = .20, p < .05). 
 
2) The Role of Organizational Norms and Compliance Motivation 
The normative belief (organizational norm) that engineers should incorporate privacy and security mechanisms into 
their systems varied among study participants. Sixty-two percent (N = 77) of the engineers in our sample work for 
organizations that expect them to consider privacy mechanisms (Mpr = 3.80; SDpr = 1.09) and 69 percent (N = 86) for 
organizations that expect security mechanisms (Msec = 4.00; SDsec = 1.04). While on average, the organizational 
norms of our engineers tend to supports privacy and security practices, still 31 percent (N = 38, for security) to 38 
percent (N = 47, for privacy) of the engineers work for organizations without clear or even negative norms on these 
values. This is especially true for research institutions when it comes to security engineering. Namely, engineers who 
work in the industry report higher normative beliefs for security than their colleagues who work in research. Whereas 
89 percent (N = 37) of the engineers who work in industry report very high normative beliefs on security, this is true 
only for 56 percent (N =40) of the engineers who work in research environments (tsec(112) = 3.03, p < .01). 
The motivation to comply with these norms is not a given. Even though the majority of engineers say that they 
want to comply with their organizations’ norms (Mpr = 3.73; SDpr = 1.04; Msec = 3.86; SDsec = 1.03), there is a 
substantial share of respondents in our sample (for privacy, 42 percent or N =51; for security, 36 percent or N = 43) 
who are not very motivated to comply. We investigated whether this lack of compliance motivation is different for 
engineers working in industry versus research organizations. For privacy, there is no significant difference (tpr(118) = 
1.87, p < . 10), but for security there is. In research and academic work environments, 47 percent (N = 33) of 
engineers do not want to comply with security norms, while this is the case for only 16 percent (N= 7) in industry 
(tsec(115) = 3.10, p < .01). How do these ambiguous normative beliefs and compliance motivations interact with 
subjective norm and engineering behavior? We find that normative beliefs are related to motivation to comply in that 
the weaker the norms in an organization, the lower the motivation to comply with these (weak) norms. In fact, the 
share of engineers who want to comply with strong norms is two to three times higher than the share of engineers 
willing to comply with weak norms (Figure 2).  
This interaction between normative beliefs (organizational norms) and motivation to comply with these norms is 
posited by the TPB to drive subjective norm. However, in our study, this interaction explains only 19 percent of the 
variance in subjective norm for privacy. When controlling for the main effects of normative belief and compliance 
motivation, none of the three factors (normative belief, compliance motivation and the interaction term between them) 
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is a significant predictor for subjective norm (F(3,119) = 9.27, p <.001, R2=.19). Instead, we find that normative 
beliefs (organizational norms) coupled with compliance motivation are actually a significant direct predictor of privacy 
engineering (F(4,118) = 5.45, p < .08, R2= .16). This means that an organization’s privacy expectations are more 
important for privacy design behavior than the engineer’s own (subjective) norms. However, the importance of the 
organizational norms only hold true when engineers are also highly motivated to comply with them (ßnbXmtc = 1.33, p 
< .01). If they do not have this motivation, as is the case for as much as 42 percent (N=51) of engineers in our 
sample, the impact of the organization is lost. Figure 2a illustrates these dynamics: the dotted line left shows that the 
high portion of engineers (57 percent or N=27)  who do not want to comply with the weak privacy norms of their 
organizations actually have the courage to ignore their organizations’ norms and sometimes implement privacy 
mechanisms despite their organizations’ lack of support. In other words, there seem to be “activist privacy engineers” 
in some organizations with weak norms that stick to their privacy convictions regardless of the organization. 
Unfortunately, this activism does not always materialize. Frequent privacy engagement can only be found in 
organizations with strong privacy norms and high compliance motivation. The care for privacy mechanisms against 
organizational norm is unique to privacy. In security engineering, weak organizational norms lead to a respectively 
rare incorporation of security mechanisms, regardless of the fact that 60 percent of engineers do not like to comply 
when working for organizations with weak security norms (Figure 2b). Organizational norm (ß = .81, p <.001) is the 
only significant predictor of the subjective norm here, explaining almost half of its variance (F(3,117) = 34.20, p 
<.001, R2= .47). Compliance issues come in for security only when organizations have strong security norms. In such 
security-focused organizations, the problem is that 25 percent (N = 43) of engineers (Figure 2b) have low compliance 
motivation and actually prefer to not engage in security engineering. 
---------------------------------------- 
Figures 2a and 2b around here 
----------------------------------------- 
3) Drivers of Perceived Behavioral Control 
Engineers’ control beliefs, that is, their belief that they believe to have the autonomy, the time and the knowledge 
to incorporate privacy and security mechanisms — vary greatly and indicate mixed levels of perceived control (Mpr = 
3.36, SDpr = 1.20; Msec = 3.42, SDsec = 1.21). About half of the respondents in our sample say that they do not have 
the autonomy to implement privacy and security mechanisms (52 percent or N = 64 for privacy and 47 percent or N = 
58) for security). Moreover, the time required for privacy and security design makes implementation difficult for the 
majority (Mpr = 2.68, SDpr = 1.09; Msec = 2.59, SDsec = 1.06). Only one in five engineers believes that time is not a 
problem and it is religiousness that is related to this belief (rpr = .25, p < .05; rsec = .17, p = .075). Trust in their own 
knowledge is well distributed among engineers (Mpr = 3.10, SDpr = 1.03; Msec = 2.95, SDsec = 1.05). Twenty-six 
percent (N = 32) believe that their knowledge makes incorporating privacy mechanisms difficult, for 35 percent (N= 
43) it makes it easy. The same is true for 33 percent (N = 41) and 34 percent (N = 42) respectively, when it comes to 
security engineering. Our regression analysis (Table 3) confirms TPB’s assumption that the three control beliefs 
successfully predict perceived behavioral control. For privacy engineering, all three predictors play a significant role 
for control perceptions. For security engineering only knowledge does not. Knowledge does, however, influence 
privacy and security engineering directly (ßpr = .51, p <.001; ßsec = .24, p <.05).  
---------------------------- 
Table 3 around here 
----------------------------- 
However, against expectations, time is negatively related to perceived behavioral control. This means that limited 
time leads engineers to think that it is (solely) up to them to incorporate privacy and security mechanisms or not to do 
so. Coupled with the fact that many indicate that their organizations do not give them enough time, it could be that we 
are witnessing an organizational conflict. It is therefore important to understand the interplay between the normative 
beliefs (organizational norms) and perceived behavioral control. We find that the weaker the norms for privacy and 
security in organizations, the more engineers feel that it is up to them to implement the values (rpr = -.19, p < .05; rsec 
= -.24, p < .01). Two-thirds of those who work in organizations with weak norms (i.e., about a third of the 
organizations in our sample) have high control perceptions for privacy and security engineering (Table 4).  
---------------------------- 
Table 4 around here 
----------------------------- 
C. The Role of Perceived Responsibility 
This interaction between organizational norm and perceived behavioral control is closely related to engineers’ 
perceived responsibility. Figures 3a to 3d show the interaction between responsibility, control perceptions and the 
organizational norms in relation to privacy and security engineering behavior, visualizing a significant three-way 
interplay between the three factors. 
---------------------------------------- 
Figures 3a to 3d around here 
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What we can see in Figures 3b and 3d (see solid lines), is that only engineers with high responsibility and high 
control implement privacy and security frequently - and they do so regardless of the organizational norms. When the 
organizational norms are weak and either control (dotted lines) or responsibility (Figures 3a and 3c) are weak as well, 
then the engineers’ implementation of privacy and security mechanisms drops. Similarly, when the norms are high 
but responsibility is low, the implementation drops regardless of perceived control. The important role of perceived 
responsibility is further shown in Table 5, where we can see that even when we control for the interactions, the main 
effect of responsibility remains strong. For security, it is the single most important predictor (ß pr = .42, p <.001; ßsec = 
.60, p < .001). It also shows that the inclusion of the interaction factors (illustrated in Figures 2a, 2b, and 3a to 3d) 
distinctly improves the predictive power of our original model to R2 = .42 and R2 = .43 for privacy and security 
engineering respectively (compared to R2=.36  and R2= .37, Table 1). In the model we see that for privacy 
engineering, it is the interplay between organizational norms and compliance motivation that is particularly relevant - 
the “activist spirit” (ß pr = .88, p < .05; ßsec = .19, p > .05.). For security engineering it is the three-way interaction 
between organizational norms, perceived behavioral control and responsibility that counts (ß pr = -.30, p < .10; ßsec = -
.40, p < .01). Privacy and security therefore seem to be driven by slightly different motivational shades.  
---------------------------- 
Table 5 around here 
----------------------------- 
V. DISCUSSION 
At the outset of our study we asked the question whether today’s privacy and security nightmares are testimony of 
a systemic failure that can be fixed with the right organizational and legal incentives, or whether we are witnessing a 
deeper socio-cultural issue that could impede our long-term hopes for more value-driven, privacy-friendly and secure 
machine designs. Our empirical results hint towards some issues beyond the influence of individual organizations.  
First of all, it must be noted that the vast majority of engineers are aware that they should be pursuing privacy and 
security by design. Our subjective norm as well as instrumental attitude measures clearly proved this awareness of 
the matter. Only a small fraction of around 10 percent of the engineers in our sample find privacy or security 
engineering useless or ignored by respected peers. While these few ‘black sheep’ will contribute to insecure and 
privacy-invasive systems, they probably do not explain the scale of privacy and security issues we witness in today’s 
organizations. Instead, it seems that we are dealing with a fundamental responsibility issue: perceived responsibility 
is the single most influential factor that explains past privacy and security engineering. Unfortunately, almost 40 
percent of our sample does not feel responsible for integrating the two values into their systems, which is a dark 
outlook for ethical machines. The finding is in line with what Lahlou and colleagues found over a decade ago [28]. In 
addition, many engineers do not find pleasure in working on the two values (on average 40 percent). Thus, for a 
substantial amount of engineers it seems a lack of perceived responsibility and ‘lack of zest’ that leads them to 
neglect the two values. Lack of zest is a particular issue for academic institutions and R&D departments. Security 
and privacy engineering is perceived as unpleasant by almost half of the engineers working in research institutions. 
Only one in ten of the engineers working in industry feel this way when it comes to security engineering, whereas one 
in three industry engineers share a lack of zest when working on privacy. Looking into correlations between attitudes 
and beliefs, we find that it is particularly the political belief to create a power balance between corporates and citizens 
that drives positive privacy as well as security attitudes; a finding mirrored in other studies [47, 63]. But also the belief 
that transparency is more important than privacy negatively correlates with privacy and security efforts. These 
correlations suggest that there are some drivers and impediments at work here at the individual level, which can 
hardly be influenced by a single organization and which might play out in many ethical machines. It seems that the 
political environment in terms of governmental and corporate trust as well as tech-cultural beliefs underlie vital 
engineering attitudes across technologies.  
That said, some of our findings point to the role organizations have to play in ensuring more value-based and 
ethical machine designs. First of all, we observe that 38 percent of the organizations in our sample have weak norms 
for privacy and 31 percent weak norms for security. Some even explicitly instruct their employees to ignore privacy 
(11 percent) and/or security design (8 percent). This is the case for all organizational types we investigated. Such 
weak norms cannot be due to a lack of legal requirements for privacy or security or a lack of available technical 
strategies. Instead, we believe that they are due to the time cost associated with security and privacy design, as well 
as organizational conflict caused by today’s personal data markets, which promise that personal data is “the oil of the 
digital economy” [81]. As far as time investment is concerned, 45 percent (N =56) of engineers stated that it is the 
time required to incorporate privacy design that makes it difficult or even very difficult for them to take care of the 
value. For security, this goes up to 50 percent (N = 62) of engineers. Conflicts over time have been reported by other 
scholars as well [25, 82], as is the case with conflicts resulting from revenue models in the app space, which depend 
on data collection and sharing [30]. Almost two thirds of engineers in our sample (64 percent) believe that personal 
information has become just another form of property that people can buy and sell. Organizations have the power to 
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change such perceptions. They can strengthen and sharpen their organizational norms around privacy and security, 
including transparency on their aspirations in personal data markets. They can also reserve more time for value-
based engineering and invest in privacy and security training (see Table 3). 
That organizations should act in this way is underlined by another one of our findings: We observe that secure 
system design suffers significantly from the interplay between weak organizational norms (normative beliefs), low 
engineering control (time, autonomy, knowledge) and limited perceived responsibility. Even if 60 percent of our 
engineers, who work for organizations with weak norms, are not motivated to comply with these weak organizational 
norms they face, they still remain passive and rarely engage in security engineering. If they do engage in security 
engineering — which happens rather rarely — they seem to be driven mainly by two particular character traits, 
namely, when they have high locus of control (r = .37, p <.05, N = 37) and when they are not motivated by the fear of 
failure (r = -.40, p < .05, N = 38). 
The dynamics are slightly different for privacy engineering. Here 43 percent of the engineers who face weak 
organizational norms dare to sometimes ignore these. This non-compliance for the good or “activist engineering” is 
much higher than what Szekely [63] observed in 2011.  
Finally, there are few personality variables that organizations might want to test for when recruiting engineers, 
which independently correlate to privacy and security engineering. The most important one is the engineer’s locus of 
control. Both privacy and security practices are positively influenced by the degree of engineers’ internal locus of 
control. This character trait may well be relevant for ethical engineering in general. Large scale reviews in ethical 
decision-making in organizations suggest it is [39]. Finally, we find that engineers with lower fear of failure, higher 
emotional stability and those who are religious are more likely to engage in the kind of ethical engineering we studied 
here.  
A. Limitations and Future Outlook 
Before closing we want to recognize some limitations of our study. Firstly, the cross-sectional design does not 
allow for causal interpretations, even though the TPB posits them. Secondly, a segment of our sample are engineers 
that work in research institutions rather than industry-based product manufacturing. We would argue that universities 
as well as corporate research departments are at the outset of the software supply-chain, determining major 
technical drivers of privacy and security design. Thirdly, we are aware that many scholars judge the use of singe-item 
measures as unacceptable. However, recent studies have shown that single-item measures have the same 
predictive validity as multiple-item measures and contribute less to the common method bias [83, 84]. This is 
particularly true when it comes to very mature scales, such as those we used here for the TPB. 
What we did not cover here, but find extremely important for future studies on engineers’ value engineering, is the 
role which SDKs (System Development Kits) and APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) play in engineers’ ability 
to truly control their work. A fascinating 2017 study by Greene and Shilton shows how engineers complain in 
developer forums about privacy design limitations already embedded in the APIs and SDKs for Android and iOS. 
Their findings point to limited development control at the technical level in highly monopolized technical platform 
environments [47]. If we want to do practically relevant IS research on engineering behavior, we may need to add 
such a technical-level view to empirical studies that complement drivers and impediments at the individual and 
organizational level. 
Furthermore, as perceived responsibility has turned out to be such an important predictor for both values, it would 
be important to understand it better. We only captured the construct with one item, which is a clear limitation of our 
research. Is perceived responsibility for value engineering a result of an engineer’s cognitive moral development? Or, 
can it be learned through education or fostered through a certain organizational climate? Our study shows that some 
personality traits, such as locus of control, hope of affiliation and hope of success are positively related to 
responsibility, whereas agreeableness, fear of failure and religiousness are negatively related to it. Further research 
may want to investigate this further.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We investigated 124 engineers in a detailed study to understand drivers and impediments of privacy and security 
engineering—two core components of machine ethics. We find that the Theory of Planned Behavior does not allow 
us to fully understand the reasons for low privacy and security engagement in today’s organizations. Instead, it 
seems to be engineers’ individually perceived responsibility that determines most of their engagement with ethics 
and the two values we investigated here, privacy and security. Perceived responsibility is not always a given. Too 
many engineers— that is, 40 percent of our sample — show limited responsibility for the two values, even though 
one would think them to be closest to the design of a system. As it turns out, organizations give engineers too little 
time and autonomy to dedicate themselves to these matters and many fail to provide their engineering staff with 
appropriate norms to follow.   
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A. Figures 
 Fig. 1. Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
(a)   Privacy Engineering              (b) Security Engineering 
 
 
Fig. 2a-b. Normative beliefs (organizational norms) and motivation to comply with these norms as direct predictors of 
(a) privacy and (b) security engineering 
 




Fig. 3a-b. Normative beliefs (organizational norms) and the perceived behavioral control as direct predictors of 
privacy engineering by engineers (a) with low responsibility and (b) high responsibility 
 
(c) Security Engineering/Low Responsibility           (d) Security Engineering/High Responsibility     
 
 Fig. 3c-d. Normative beliefs (organizational norms) and the perceived behavioral control as direct predictors of 

















PREDICTORS FOR PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENGINEERING (BASED ON TPB) 
Dependent variable Privacy engineering in the past 4-5 years 
Security engineering 
in the past 4-5 years 
Predictor variables B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Constant -1.56 0.72   -2.05 0.68   -0.55 0.78   -1.24 0.69   
Instrumental attitudes  0.66 0.16 0.38*** 0.59 0.15 0.33*** 0.28 0.13 0.18* 0.30 0.12 0.19* 
Experiential attitudes  0.18 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.63 0.15 0.37*** 0.43 0.13 0.26** 
Subjective norm 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.03 
Perceived behavioral 
control 0.23 0.10 0.19* 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.09 0.10 -0.07 
Responsibility     0.45 0.10 0.35***    0.54 0.09 0.46** 
             
R2 change .28*** .10*** .21*** .19*** 
Adjusted R2 .26*** .36*** .18*** .37***  
   Notes. B=estimated coefficient; SE = standard error; ß = standardized coefficient. Significance *p<.05; 




MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND BINOMINAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL BELIEFS ABOUT 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENGINEERING  
Political (PB) and Technical 












1. PB: Designing user-privacy 
systems into systems is important 
to enable a power balance 
between CORPORATIONS and 
citizens 
4,12 0,98 .28** .22* .24** 0.14
2. PB: Designing user-privacy into 
systems is important to enable a 
power balance between 
GOVERNMENTS and citizens 
3,94 1,02 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.13
3. PB: I think that more data means 
more knowledge 3,60 1,10 0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.09
4. PB: I think that personal 
information has become just 
another form of property that 
people can sell or buy 
3,41 1,33 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.08
5. PB: I think that freedom of speech 
is more important than privacy 3,09 1,07 -0.22 -0.15 -0.08 -0.05
6. PB: I think that transparency is 
more important than privacy 3,00 1,11 -.36* -.41** -0.13 -.29*
7. TB: Ensuring user-privacy in a 
system is a legal issue rather than 
a technical one 
2,95 1,27 -0.12 0.07 -0.09 0.14
8. TB: I think that technology is 
neutral 2,88 1,43 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.10
9. TB: Efforts to fully secure a 
system are often futile, because 
good hackers can circumvent any 
security. 
2,81 1,31 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 -0.10
10. TB: I think that with the right 
cryptographic mechanisms most 
privacy problems can be solved 
2,44 1,24 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.08
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11. TB: As Ubiquitous Computing 
systems inherently rely on the 
collection of large amounts of 
data, privacy and UbiComp is a 
contradiction 
2,43 1,11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03
12. TB: I think that it is possible, in 
principle, to build error-free 
systems 
2,21 1,28 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 .20*
Notes. The beliefs are ordered by average agreement, i.e., disagreement; Beliefs in bold are significant predictors of 
attitudes towards privacy and/or security engineering; M= mean SD = standard deviation. Significance *p<.05; 




PERCEIVED BEHAVIORAL CONTROL AND PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENGINEERING PREDICTED BY CONTROL BELIEFS ABOUT 
KNOWLEDGE, TIME AND AUTONOMY 
Dependent variable  Perceived behavioral control Engineering behavior in the past 4-5 years Privacy Security Privacy Security 
Predictor variable B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß 
Constant 1,86 0,29   2,50 0,28   0,29 0,42  1,82 0,44  
Perceived behavioral 
control / / 0,07 0,11 0,06 0,12 0,12 0,12 
Knowledge  0,26 0,10 0,25* 0,07 0,10 0,07 0,67 0,13 0,51*** 0,30 0,14 0,24* 
Time  -0,25 0,09 -0,25** -0,20 0,10 -0,22* 0,08 0,12 0,07 0,15 0,13 0,13 
Autonomy   0,48 0,07 0,54*** 0,42 0,07 0,53*** 0,07 0,11 0,06 -0,17 0,12 -0,16 
             
Adjusted R2 .35*** .25*** .34*** .11** 
Notes. B=estimated coefficient; SE = standard error; ß = standardized coefficient. Significance *p<.05; **p<.01. 
***p<.001. N=121, Dependent variables: left: perceived behavioral control; right: privacy and security engineering




PROPORTION OF ENGINEERS’ WITH HIGH AND LOW PERCEIVED BEHAVIORAL CONTROL (PBC) OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY DESIGN IN ORGANIZATIONS WITH WEAK AND STRONG NORMATIVE BELIEFS (ORGANIZATIONAL 
NORMS) FOR PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENGINEERING 
Organizations 
with: 
 Privacy Security 
 Engineers with: Organizations 
with: 
Engineers with: 
 Low PBC High PBC Total   Low PBC High PBC Total 
Weak  
norms  
N 17 30 47 (38%)   Weak  
  norms  
N 13 25 38 (31%)
% 36% 64% 100% % 34% 66% 100% 
Strong  
norms  
N 45 31 76 (62%)   Strong  
  norms  
N 49 36 85 (69%)
% 59% 41% 100% % 58% 42% 100% 
Total N 62 61 123    Total N 62 61 123 % 50% 50% 100% % 50% 50% 100% 
 
TABLE V 
ADJUSTED MODELS FOR PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENGINEERING 
Dependent variable Privacy engineering in the past 4-5 years 
Security engineering 
in the past 4-5 years 
Predictor variables B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß B SE ß Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Constant -2,100,69   -0,50 1,66   -1,74 ,68   -2,84 1,34   
Instrumental attitudes 0,56 0,15 0,32*** 0,49 0,15 0,28** 0,32 0,14 0,19* 0,30 0,13 0,18* 
Experiential attitudes 0,23 0,12 0,15 0,25 0,12 0,16* 0,28 0,12 0,18* 0,24 0,12 0,16* 




(organizational norm) 0,25 0,11 0,20* 
-
0,25 0,33 -0,20 0,28 0,13 0,23* 0,31 0,31 0,25 
Motivation to comply -0,170,11 -0,13 -0,84 0,35 -0,64* 0,11 0,11 0,09 -0,02 0,34 -0,01 
Perceived behavioral 
control 0,10 0,10 0,08 0,27 0,16 0,22 -0,04 0,10 -0,03 0,25 0,14 0,19 
Responsibility 0,40 0,10 0,31*** 0,54 0,13 0,42*** 0,50 0,09 0,43* 0,70 0,11 0,60***
Normative belief × 
motivation to comply    0,18 0,08 0,88*    0,03 0,08 0,19 
Normative belief × 
perceived behavioral 
control × responsibility 
   -0,01 0,01 -0,30†    -0,02 0,01 -0,40**
             
             
R2 change .42*** .04* .44*** .04*** 
Adjusted R2 .38*** .42*** .40*** .43*** 
Notes. B=estimated coefficient; SE = standard error; ß = standardized coefficient. Significance *p<.05; 
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